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Abstract: This article analyses the interaction between alliance experience and behavioural 
uncertainty to improve our understanding of alliance governance. We investigate the extent to 
which the effect of alliance experience on governance choices is explained by a reduction in 
“mundane” transaction costs or by a reduction in “opportunistic” transaction costs. Based 
on more than 12,000 firm experiences with equity and non-equity alliances, we demonstrate a 
reduction in mundane transaction costs over time by firms reusing the same governance 
structure in successive alliances. We also find that in high behavioural uncertainty alliances, 
firms rely on their experience as a substitute for equity governance to reduce opportunistic 
transaction costs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
During the formation of a new alliance firms must make a decision on the governance 
structure of the alliance. Previous research has shown that governance decisions are heavily 
influenced by the potential for opportunistic behaviour by the firms’ alliance partners 
(Madhok et al., 2015; Sampson, 2004; Williamson, 1996). The study of the hazard of 
opportunism, also referred to as behavioural uncertainty, has a long tradition in transaction 
cost economics (TCE). Empirical studies in TCE have shown that firms are much more likely 
to opt for strong governance safeguards in the form of equity sharing when behavioural 
uncertainty is high, but firms rely on non-equity alliances when they believe the potential for 
opportunism is negligible (Hennart, 1988, 1991; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Oxley and 
Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2004).  
Although these studies have contributed important insights on the efficiency of 
governance structures, they have also been criticized for taking a static perspective on 
governance (Faems et al., 2008; Reuer et al., 2016). They analyse governance structures as 
potentially efficient choices at a particular moment in time, but ignore that these choices are 
influenced by the alliance history of a firm (Gulati, 1995). An emerging research field argues 
that the study of optimal governance choices should be complemented by a consideration for 
alliance dynamics (Das and Teng, 2002; Reuer et al., 2016). This article contributes to this 
emerging research field, and shows that combining the study of alliance dynamics with the 
study of efficient governance modes leads to a better understanding of firms’ governance 
choices. In this article we study the experience that firms have with different types of 
governance structures, and in particular their experience with equity and non-equity alliances 
during a five-year period preceding the new alliance. We propose that governance experience 
affects governance choices in two different ways; either by reducing “mundane transaction 
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costs” over time or by “reducing opportunistic transaction costs” (Baldwin, 2008; Langlois, 
2006).  
The first effect is derived from studies that argue that governance choices are 
influenced by the governance structures that firms have experienced in the past (Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007; Faems et al., 2008). Firms reuse the same governance structures in successive 
alliances to reduce the costs of establishing and managing new alliances (Li et al., 2010). 
Langlois (2006) and Baldwin (2008) have referred to these costs as “mundane transaction 
costs”. Examples of these costs include the costs of describing, communicating, and 
negotiating the transaction; the costs of measuring to verify the quality of the transacted 
object; and the costs of valuing the object and paying for it (Baldwin, 2008). Since equity and 
non-equity alliances are different types of governance structures, some of these mundane 
transaction costs will be more apparent in one governance form compared to the other: for 
instance, equity alliances will have higher bureaucratic costs, while non-equity alliances 
spend time and costs on describing contractual terms and conditions (Sampson, 2005). As 
firms accumulate experience with a particular governance form, they are able to reduce the 
mundane transaction costs over time when they choose the same governance form for a new 
alliance (Ryall and Sampson, 2006). We therefore expect firms with equity alliance 
experience to use equity alliances again, and firms with non-equity alliance experience to use 
non-equity alliances again.   
The second effect is derived from studies that argue that alliance experience may 
reduce behavioural uncertainty and the associated opportunistic transaction costs, and 
consequently firms need to rely less on the strong safeguards of an equity alliance. Experience 
thus acts as a substitute for equity alliances (Schreiner et al., 2009; Shipilov and Stern, 2016; 
Teng and Das, 2008). Alliance experience provides firms with collaborative know-how 
(Simonin, 1997) that enables them to make better judgements on the potential for 
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opportunistic behaviour (Gulati et al., 2009). Firms with equity alliance experience have not 
only dealt with behavioural uncertainty in the past, but their collaborative know-how allows 
them to reduce behavioural uncertainty in the process and, hence, rely less on strong 
safeguards in the future (Richards and Yang, 2007).  
 To empirically analyse the two effects of governance experience on governance 
choice, we studied 3,724 alliance governance choices made by firms between 2009 and 2011. 
These firms have 8,621 earlier experiences with non-equity alliances and 3,486 experiences 
with equity alliances between 2004 and 2010. We first put our data to the test by replicating 
the comparative static finding prevalent in received theory that higher behavioural uncertainty 
is associated with equity alliances. Subsequently we introduce governance experience into 
TCE’s comparative static analysis and our results show that firms are relatively consistent in 
their alliance governance choices: firms that have experience with non-equity alliances are 
more likely to choose non-equity alliances again, and firms that have experience with equity 
alliances are more likely to choose equity again in a subsequent alliance. However, the 
introduction of governance experience also has an effect on opportunistic transaction costs, 
which manifests itself in high-uncertainty alliances. Our results show that firms with a large 
experience with equity alliances are less likely to choose equity again to govern a high-
uncertainty alliance. This corroborates that alliance experience acts as a substitute for equity 
governance (Shipilov and Stern, 2016), but only for alliances that are confronted by high 
behavioural uncertainty and therefore must mitigate opportunistic transaction costs.  
The main contribution of our article is to show that governance experience affects 
governance choices. We offer a better understanding of governance choices by going beyond 
the traditional static analysis of governance structures. By integrating experience into the 
analysis, we show that firms choose the same governance structure over time to reduce 
mundane transaction costs and they rely on their experience to govern an alliance and reduce 
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opportunistic transaction costs. We respond to recent studies that argue there is considerable 
scope for future research to examine how alliance experience and capabilities design 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Wang and Rajagopalan, 2014). 
 
 
THEORY 
Alliance governance: equity alliances versus non-equity alliances  
We distinguish between alliances in which equity is shared and alliances in which no equity is 
shared. Previous research has highlighted the differences between these two types of alliance 
governance structures (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989; Reuer et al., 
2016). Equity alliances involve the formation of a separate entity in which each of the 
partners owns a portion of the equity. The allocation of ownership shares in the new venture 
aligns incentives among the partners, and an administrative hierarchy of managers oversees 
day-to-day functioning and addresses contingencies as they arise (Gulati and Singh, 1998). A 
board of directors is the primary mechanism through which each partner exercises its residual 
rights of control, and by allocating these rights equity alliances reduce the need for partners to 
specify all contingencies in their initial agreement (Pisano, 1989; Reuer et al., 2014). In 
contrast, non-equity alliances do not involve equity sharing or the creation of a new entity 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998). A key distinguishing governance feature of non-equity alliances is 
the specification of an incentive alignment in (bilateral) contractual agreements (Oxley, 1997; 
Reuer and Ariño, 2007). Ongoing activities are jointly coordinated, with all partners working 
from their own organization, and when contingencies arise, new decisions are negotiated 
between the partners (Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
 
 
 6 
Behavioural uncertainty and equity governance 
The received view on governance structures (e.g. Tadelis and Williamson, 2012) has 
adopted the ‘discriminatory alignment hypothesis’ that aligns different governance structures 
to different transactions, so as to minimize transaction costs. In our case, the adaptive 
capacities of equity or non-equity alliances are matched to the attributes of the transactions, 
such as behavioural uncertainty. Research on inter-firm collaborations has shown that 
behavioural uncertainty, defined as the uncertainty of encountering opportunistic behaviour, 
can explain why firms form complex equity-based arrangements rather than depend on 
simpler non-equity agreements (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Jolink and Niesten, 2012; Pisano, 1989). 
Equity alliances possess governance capacities such as additional monitoring rights and 
administrative controls that provide safeguards against opportunistic behaviour (Niesten and 
Jolink, 2012; Oxley, 1997; Pangarkar and Klein, 2001; Reuer et al., 2016). In contrast, the 
capacities of non-equity agreements are a more efficient match for transactions characterized 
by low or moderate levels of behavioural uncertainty, as Krishnan et al. (2015) concluded in a 
recent meta-analysis. 
In the context of alliances, opportunistic behaviour is defined as “behaviour by a 
partner firm that is motivated to pursue its self-interest with deceit to achieve gains at the 
expense of the other alliance members” (Das and Rahman, 2010, p. 57). Deceit by an alliance 
partner is reflected in calculated efforts to mislead, distort, and disguise information (Niesten 
and Jolink, 2012; Williamson, 1985). It is easier for an alliance partner to distort and disguise 
information when the alliance is characterized by asymmetric or unverifiable information (Li, 
Qian, and Qian, 2013; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Wathne and Heide, 2000). Alliances 
characterized by information asymmetry – and therefore subject to a higher likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour – can involve partners that differ substantially from each other and 
that are not equally informed about each other’s business environment and operations (Wang 
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and Zajac, 2007). The research on alliances has linked information asymmetry and a higher 
potential for opportunistic behaviour to various differences between alliance partners, such as 
industrial dissimilarity (Das and Rahman, 2010), cultural distance (Chang et al., 2008; Das 
and Rahman, 2010; Johnson et al., 1996; Lee, 1998; Li et al., 2010; Pangarkar and Klein, 
2001) and geographic distance (Li et al., 2010; Reuer and Lahiri, 2014). For instance, cross-
cultural collaborative arrangements are often replete with misunderstandings and 
miscommunication (Johnson et al., 1998), thus fostering opportunistic tendencies. Others 
have also argued the reverse, i.e. that more, and more reliable, information is available for 
domestic partners and that partner opportunism is lower when alliance members come from 
similar industries (Das and Rahman, 2010; Pangarkar and Klein, 2001).  
In line with the consensus in the alliance literature, we replicate the finding that 
behavioural uncertainty in alliances is higher when the alliance partners have dissimilar 
industrial, cultural and national backgrounds, and we expect that alliances characterized by 
behavioural uncertainty are more often governed by equity alliances. We will replicate these 
findings with the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. Firms that enter into an alliance characterized by high behavioural uncertainty are more 
likely to choose an equity governance structure. 
H1a. Firms that enter into an alliance with a partner from a different industry are more likely 
to choose an equity governance structure. 
H1b. Firms that enter into an alliance with a partner from a different culture are more likely 
to choose an equity governance structure. 
H1c. Firms that enter into an alliance with a partner from a different country are more likely 
to choose an equity governance structure. 
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Alliance experience and reduction of mundane transaction costs 
While there is an extensive amount of research on the relation between behavioural 
uncertainty and governance, this is less the case for the relation between alliance experience 
and governance choices. Studies addressing the latter topic show that firms make discrete 
governance choices and intentionally accumulate experience with one alliance governance 
form (Anand et al., 2016). This is due, in part, to the difference in managing an equity alliance 
compared to managing a non-equity alliance (Anand and Khanna, 2000), but it can also be 
attributed to the consideration that benefits of governance experience largely accrue from a 
single governance mode (Gulati et al., 2009). As a consequence, the alliance experience in 
one governance form will lead to a continued use of that form (Wang and Rajagopalan, 2015). 
The reasons for accumulating experience with one alliance governance form lie in the 
substantial differences between equity and non-equity alliances (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989; Reuer et al., 2016), and firms’ adaptive capability to reduce 
transaction costs over time with increasing experience in one governance form (Ryall and 
Sampson, 2006).  
With respect to equity alliances, Sampson (2005) argues that equity sharing relieves 
firms from fully specifying alliance activities in a contract, but equity alliances impose more 
bureaucratic costs on the inter-firm relation. Applying the experience-curve literature, she 
claims that experience and learning will reduce these bureaucratic costs over time (Sampson, 
2005). Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) also apply the notion of experience effects and 
associated unit-cost reductions to inter-firm relations and highlight that learning effects have 
also been found to play out in repeated equity alliances.  
With respect to non-equity alliances, Ryall and Sampson (2006, p. 207) argue that 
firms with experience in drafting contracts will specify the rights, obligations, and 
development processes of new alliance contracts at lower cost. In line with this study, Li et al. 
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(2010, p.152) posit that firms experienced in managing non-equity alliances “have learned 
how to specify, monitor and enforce a contract in non-equity alliances”, and “this experience 
will decrease the transaction cost of future non-equity alliances”. In another study on non-
equity alliances, Schreiner et al., (2009) argue that alliance capabilities, which develop with 
an accumulation of alliance experience, mitigate the costs associated with managing 
interdependence between alliance partners.  
Based on these studies, we expect that firms with experience in equity sharing in an 
alliance will continue choosing equity sharing in a subsequent alliance, to reduce mundane 
transaction costs. These firms have experience with establishing a new entity, a hierarchical 
structure and ownership sharing, and their experience enables them to reduce costs in a new 
equity alliance. Similarly, we expect firms with experience in non-equity alliances to continue 
choosing the non-equity governance form for a new alliance, also to reduce mundane 
transaction costs. Their experience with formulating contract terms and negotiating new 
decisions allows these firms to reduce mundane transaction costs in a new non-equity 
alliance. We therefore formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 
H2a. Firms that have accumulated more experience with equity sharing in alliances are more 
likely to choose equity governance for new alliances.  
H2b. Firms that have accumulated more experience with non-equity alliances are less likely 
to choose equity governance for new alliances.  
 
Alliance experience and reduction of opportunistic transaction costs 
Several studies have also observed that alliance experience may lead to a reduction of 
opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Li et al., 2010; Rahman and Korn, 2014). A variety of 
explanations have been proposed for this effect, derived from attributes of the alliance and the 
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firm. At the alliance level, governance experience enables partners to add more detail to a 
collaboration to clarify expectations about behaviour in an alliance, which may in turn lower 
opportunism (Ryall and Sampson, 2006). Prior experience in managing alliances may also 
enable alliance partners to create stronger bonds and reduce the need for safeguards against 
opportunistic behaviour (Schreiner et al., 2009). Several studies emphasize that alliance 
experience allows firms to rely less on equity governance as they learn to deal with alliances 
and rely more on inter-firm trust (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Subramanian and Soh, 2016; 
Teng and Das, 2008). As inter-firm trust will make opportunistic behaviour less likely, trust 
reduces the required safeguards and effectively lowers opportunistic transaction costs. 
Alliance experience and capabilities can therefore act as a substitute for equity governance 
(Teng and Das, 2008).  
 At the firm level, scholars have argued that alliance experience results in a positive 
reputation for a firm, which curtails the firm’s opportunistic behaviour in alliances 
(Pangarkar, 2003; Ryall and Sampson, 2006). Experience also provides firms with alliance 
capabilities that increase their awareness of the hazard of opportunism in alliances (Gulati et 
al., 2009). These capabilities enable firms to prevent or counteract opportunistic behaviour by 
their partners that would involve unfair or asymmetric value capture (Wang and Rajagopalan, 
2015). Firms with collaborative know-how are able to search out reliable partners, effectively 
anticipate contingencies and design bonding mechanisms to discourage opportunism (Chang 
et al., 2008, p. 301). It has also been noted that these effects of alliance experience are mainly 
observed in equity alliances and none in non-equity arrangements (Anand and Khanna, 2000), 
because firms with equity alliance experience have dealt with behavioural uncertainty in the 
past (Richards and Yang, 2007). 
 We contribute to this field of research by studying firms with equity alliance 
experience and expect they are less likely to choose that same governance mode (equity 
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sharing) in subsequent alliances characterized by high behavioural uncertainty. We thus 
expect that firms substitute experience for equity governance, and rely on their experience to 
reduce opportunistic transaction costs. This effect will only be observed for high uncertainty 
alliances, because opportunistic transaction costs can only be reduced when opportunistic 
behaviour prevails. We therefore formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H3: As experience with equity increases, the need for equity governance for alliances 
characterized by high behavioural uncertainty declines. 
H3a: As experience with equity increases, the need for equity governance for alliances with 
partners from different industries declines. 
H3b: As experience with equity increases, the need for equity governance for alliances with 
partners from different cultures declines. 
H3c: As experience with equity increases, the need for equity governance for alliances with 
partners from different countries declines. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and data 
To include data on equity and non-equity governance structures, we combined two sets of 
data from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database on inter-firm relations: one on 
alliances in which equity is shared and another on alliances in which no equity is shared. 
From these data sets we removed alliances that were classified as ‘letters of intent’, ‘pending’ 
or ‘terminated’, and we only included alliances that were classified as ‘completed’ or 
‘signed’. We also removed alliances with more than two partners and only included bilateral 
alliances. This allowed us to use measures of dissimilarity and distance between alliance 
partners that were the same across all the alliances in our dataset and thus reflected 
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behavioural uncertainty in the same way. Furthermore, we excluded alliances with non-profit 
organizations. We also removed alliances with undisclosed partners, as we required the 
information of the alliance partner to calculate experience and to link the SDC database to 
information in the Thomson One database. Our dataset contains information on 3,724 alliance 
choices between 2009 and 2011, and it includes 2,040 choices for equity governance 
structures and 1,684 choices for non-equity governance structures.  
 
 
Variables and measures 
Our dependent variable Equity Governance Structure reflects the governance choice of a firm 
entering into an alliance with another firm. It captures the likelihood that firms choose an 
equity governance structure for their inter-firm relation. The dependent variable is thus a 
binary variable, with 1 reflecting the choice of an equity governance structure and 0 reflecting 
the choice of a non-equity governance structure.   
We include two independent variables on alliance experience: Experience with Equity 
Alliances and Experience with Non-equity Alliances. We consider these two types of 
accumulated experience for a five-year period using the SDC database (Ryall and Sampson, 
2006). We consider experience with equity or non-equity alliances in the years from 2004 
until 2008 for alliances established in 2009, from 2005 until 2009 for alliances established in 
2010, and from 2006 until 2010 for alliances established in 2011. When a firm is part of a 
larger holding, we include the experience of the holding company in the amount of experience 
of the firm because we assume that alliance knowledge is also stored at the holding level and 
may be transferred to subsidiaries when they enter into alliances (Heimeriks et al., 2007; 
Inkpen, 1998). The distributions of these two variables displayed a positive skewness, and we 
therefore redefined them using the natural log transformation (Zollo et al., 2002).  
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Furthermore, as a proxy for behavioural uncertainty we include three independent 
variables to capture the dissimilarity of alliance partners. We use codes from the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system to measure the Industry Dissimilarity of Alliance 
Partners (as used extensively by others, e.g., Cui and Kumar, 2012; Lin et al., 2009; Reuer 
and Koza, 2000; Reuer and Lahiri, 2014; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Wang and Zajac, 
2007). This is an ordinal variable with five categories of increasing dissimilarity. Firms are in 
the same industry when they have the same (primary) four-digit code, they are in a different 
industry but the same industry group when the last digit is different, they are in a different 
industry group but the same major group when the last two digits are different, they are in a 
different major group but the same division when the last three digits are different, and they 
are in a different division when the SIC codes are entirely different. The base level of this 
ordinal variable is the category of alliance partners that are in the same industry (i.e., they 
have the same four-digit code). We chose this category as the base level because it allows us 
to compare alliance partners in the four categories that reflect dissimilarity (i.e., partners in 
different industries, different industry groups, different major groups and different divisions) 
to alliance partners that are in the same industry and thus test the relation between industry 
dissimilarity (as a first proxy for behavioural uncertainty) and the choice of equity 
governance. 
Cultural Distance between Alliance Partners is determined using Hofstede’s six-item 
measure, which includes power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, 
long-term orientation and indulgence. We calculate a score for each alliance partner’s national 
culture and subtract the scores to obtain the cultural distance using the following formula: 
𝐶𝐷 = √((𝑃𝐷1 − 𝑃𝐷2)2 + (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣1 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣2)2 + (𝑀1 −𝑀2)2 + (𝑈𝐴1 − 𝑈𝐴2)2
+ (𝐿𝑇𝑂1 − 𝐿𝑇𝑂2)2 + (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑙1 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑙2)2) 
in which PD refers to power distance, Indiv to individualism, M to masculinity, UA to 
 14 
uncertainty avoidance, LTO to long-term orientation, and Indul to indulgence (Minkov and 
Hofstede, 2011). An increase in the value of this measure describes an increase in cultural 
distance between the alliance partners. 
Country Dissimilarity of Alliance Partners is a binary variable, and it is coded as 0 
when the country of the two partners is the same and as 1 when the country of the two 
partners is different. While there are other measures that reflect dissimilarity in terms of 
geography, such as geographic distance (Reuer and Lahiri, 2014), country dissimilarity is a 
better reflection of differences that are pertinent to governance choices in institutional 
environments across countries (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). These differences are likely to be 
a source of behavioural uncertainty and are therefore relevant when predicting a firm’s choice 
of equity governance.  
We include three interaction terms to be able to test hypotheses 3-3c. These terms 
multiply each of the three variables reflecting behavioural uncertainty (industry dissimilarity, 
cultural distance and country dissimilarity) with experience with equity alliances. An increase 
in the value of the interaction terms describes increasing levels of dissimilarity / distance and 
increasing experience with equity.   
We also include six control variables. A first control variable is Alliance Purpose.  
Pangarkar and Klein (2001) find a significant impact of the purpose of the alliance formation 
on the choice of the governance structure. The SDC database offers an activity description 
and a more elaborate deal text for each alliance. Based on these descriptions, we categorized 
each alliance into one of three categories: R&D, production, and marketing. An alliance is 
coded as an R&D alliance when the SDC description refers to research, development or 
improvement of a product or service or to the discovery or creation of a new product or 
service. The alliance is coded as a production alliance when the description refers to 
producing, making, assembling, constructing or manufacturing or to establishing, building or 
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operating a plant or production facility. The remaining alliances are coded as marketing 
alliances. Occasionally, the deal texts indicate that an alliance is involved in more than one 
stage of the value chain. To reduce the number of categories for this variable, we only code 
the first stage of the value chain, with R&D preceding production, and production preceding 
marketing. 
Technology Transfer is a binary variable, with 1 indicating that technology transfer is 
part of the alliance and 0 indicating that no technology transfer occurs. This variable is 
included in the SDC database. 
Industry of the Alliance is included as a control variable because firms in certain 
industries may be more inclined to choose equity governance. Gulati and Singh (1998) argue 
that firms in industries with a loose appropriability regime are subject to involuntary leakage 
of their profits and may therefore prefer equity-based governance structures. We grouped the 
primary SIC code of the alliances into 10 divisions (www.osha.gov) representing a collection 
of industries: agriculture, forestry and fishing (SIC codes 0111−0971); mining (1011−1499); 
construction (1521−1799); manufacturing (2011−3999); transportation, communications, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services (4011−4971); wholesale trade (5012−5199); retail trade 
(5211−5999); finance, insurance, and real estate (6000−6799); services (7011−8999); and 
public administration (9111-9721).  
Venture Capital Backing of Alliance Partners is included as a binary control variable, 
and it measures whether an alliance partner is backed by venture capital (VC). We include 
this control variable because previous research has demonstrated that VC-backed firms are 
less likely to form an equity alliance (Jolink and Niesten, 2016). Information on the VC 
backing of partners was obtained from Thomson One by manually searching for the names of 
the alliance partners (obtained from the SDC database) in Thomson One’s information on 
venture deals. The partners are coded as VC backed if they receive venture capital in the year 
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of the announcement date of the collaboration or in any of the four years preceding the year of 
the announcement (Wang et al., 2012).  
Firms may have tax reasons to initiate an equity alliance (PWC, 2012); therefore, we 
include a binary variable that indicates whether an alliance or the partners are located in a Tax 
Haven using the list of countries from Gravelles (2015).  
To control for unobserved heterogeneity during the study period (2009-2011), we 
include a control variable reflecting the Year of the Alliance (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; Reuer and 
Lahiri, 2014). 
 
Estimation methods 
Our dataset contains information on firms’ choices about alliance governance for the period 
2009 until 2011, and it includes partially overlapping and successive periods of alliance 
experience (2004−2008; 2005−2009; 2006−2010). Since firms can initiate more than one 
alliance in the time period of our study, some firms are included more than once in our 
dataset. To cope with this unbalanced panel and the correlation between repeated observations 
for firms over time, we used generalized estimating equations (GEE) and clustered at the firm 
level. GEE has been used in prior studies with models containing clusters of firms (e.g., 
Hambrick and Quigley, 2014). The interpretation of odds ratios in models estimated with 
GEE is the same as in standard logit models. The advantage of GEE is that it accounts for 
correlations due to repeated measurements or clusters in the data (Lalonde et al., 2013). Our 
six models were estimated using the xtgee function in Stata 14. As the dependent variable was 
a binary variable, we specified a binary logit model. Using the linktest command in Stata, we 
confirmed that logit is the appropriate link function and that there is a linear relationship 
between the independent variables and the logit of the dependent variable. We used an 
exchangeable correlation structure because the observations within each cluster are correlated, 
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unlike the observations from different clusters. All the models were estimated using robust 
standard errors to provide a conservative test of our hypotheses.  
 
RESULTS 
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the variables. Table II reports the association 
coefficients and reports the Cramer’s V, because we include several categorical variables. 
Table III provides the results and includes the GEE model containing only the control 
variables (model 1) and the five GEE models containing the control and independent 
variables (models 2-6), all of which predict the likelihood that an alliance has equity 
governance. Model 2 includes the cultural distance between partners and model 3 includes the 
country dissimilarity of partners. We introduce these two independent variables in separate 
models because of the high correlation between them (see Table II). Models 4-6 include the 
interaction terms that multiply each of the three types of dissimilarity with experience with 
equity. The six models are statistically significant (see table III).  
We find support for the replication of the findings prevalent in TCE (hypotheses 1-1c), 
which associate higher behavioural uncertainty with a greater likelihood of equity 
governance. Behavioural uncertainty is measured by industrial dissimilarity, cultural distance 
and country dissimilarity. The base category of the ordinal variable industry dissimilarity of 
partners is alliance partners in the same industry. The odds ratios of the categories that reflect 
dissimilarity between partners therefore represent the factor change in the odds of choosing 
equity governance when compared to alliance partners in the same industry. The results show 
that firms with partners in a different industrial division, a different major group, and a 
different industry group have higher odds of choosing equity. In model 2, the odds of 
choosing equity are 1.446 times higher for partners in a different division (p-value is lower 
than 0.000), 2.141 times higher for partners in a different major group (p-value is lower than 
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0.000), and 1.439 times higher for partners in a different industry group (p-value = 0.013). 
The results also show that the odds of choosing equity increase by a factor of 1.034 when the 
cultural distance between partners increases by 1 (p-value is lower than 0.000). Model 3 
reports results that are consistent with the findings of model 2. This model does not include 
cultural distance but includes country dissimilarity of partners instead. The odds of choosing 
equity are 1.384 times higher for alliance partners from different countries than for partners 
from the same country (p-value is lower than 0.000). Models 2 and 3 thus offer consistent 
results for the relation between higher behavioural uncertainty and the choice of equity 
governance (for the three different specifications of uncertainty). 
 The results of model 2 (and model 3) also show that we find support for hypotheses 2a 
and 2b, which associate experience with equity with a higher likelihood of choosing equity 
governance, and non-equity experience with a lower likelihood of choosing equity 
governance. The odds of choosing equity governance increase by a factor of 1.690 (1.726) 
when the natural logarithm of experience with equity alliances increases by 1. The odds ratio 
of experience with non-equity alliances is 0.579 (0.585), indicating that a one-unit increase in 
the natural logarithm of non-equity alliance experience reduces the odds of choosing equity 
governance by 42.1 (41.5) per cent. The p-values of both variables are below 0.000. These 
findings suggest that firms take the reduction of mundane transaction costs into consideration 
in their governance decisions because they choose the same governance structure in 
successive alliances. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I about here 
Insert Table II about here 
Insert Table III about here 
----------------------------------- 
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 Model 4 includes the interaction term that multiplies industry dissimilarity and 
experience with equity. The odds ratio of this term is 0.988 with a p-value of 0.030. This 
result confirms hypothesis 3a, and shows that firms that form alliances with a partner in a 
different industry and that have a large experience with equity alliances are less likely to enter 
into an equity alliance. Models 5 and 6 include the interaction terms that multiply cultural 
distance and country dissimilarity (respectively) with experience with equity. The odds ratios 
of these terms show similar results and confirm hypotheses 3b and 3c. Firms that form 
alliances with partners from a different country and at a large cultural distance and that have 
experience with equity alliance are less likely to enter into an equity alliance. These results of 
models 4-6 confirm our claims that firms use their experience as a substitute for equity 
governance to reduce opportunistic costs in an alliance.  
We also offer graphical representations of these results and a discussion in terms of 
probabilities. The probabilities are intuitively more meaningful and less prone to 
misinterpretation than odds ratios (Hoetker, 2007; Reuer and Lahiri, 2014). Figure 1 
compares the effects of equity alliance experience on equity governance for alliance partners 
in the same industry and for partners in a different industry (as proxies for low and high levels 
of behavioural uncertainty, respectively). When generating the margins for experience with 
equity and the different categories of industry dissimilarity displayed in figure 1 (or cultural 
distance and country dissimilarity in figures 2-3), we set the other variables in the GEE model 
at the mean. The figure illustrates that when equity alliance experience increases from 0 to 32 
(natural log of 32 is 3.47), the firms’ probability of choosing equity governance increases by 
39.2 per cent when the partners come from the same industry. However, with increasing 
equity alliance experience, the probability that firms choose equity governance increases only 
by 28.7 per cent when the partners come from a different major industrial group, where the 
maximum change could have been 35.4 per cent. This means that experienced firms will rely 
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less on equity governance and use their experience as a substitute for equity governance in 
high behavioural uncertainty alliances, because in these alliances they are able to reduce 
opportunistic transaction costs. We observe the same patterns for other proxies of behavioural 
uncertainty, including cultural distance and country dissimilarity. Figure 2 illustrates that 
partners with an above-average cultural distance have a lower increase in the probability of 
choosing equity with increasing experience than partners with below-average cultural 
distance. The change in probability of choosing equity for firms with an above average 
cultural distance is 32.5 per cent, whereas the maximum change could have been 43 per cent. 
Figure 3 shows that firms with partners from a different country have a lower increase in the 
probability of choosing equity with increasing experience than firms with partners from the 
same country. The change in probability of choosing equity for firms with a partner from a 
different country is 34.5 per cent, whereas the maximum change could have been 45.4 per 
cent. This is again due to experience acting as a substitute for equity governance for alliances 
characterized by a higher behavioural uncertainty and to the potential for reducing 
opportunistic transaction costs in these high-uncertainty alliances. These results provide 
support for hypotheses 3-3c. 
With respect to the control variables, the six models show that technology transfer in 
an alliance and the VC backing of alliance partners are linked to lower odds of choosing 
equity, whereas alliances in tax havens and in industries such as mining, construction, 
transportation and finance are linked to higher odds of choosing equity. The control variable 
alliance purpose shows that production alliances are more likely to be governed by equity 
when compared to R&D alliances. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Robustness  
We checked for multicollinearity of the independent and control variables. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of cultural distance and country dissimilarity is 2.93, which is the reason 
we include these two variables in two separate models. When we exclude either cultural 
distance or country dissimilarity, the VIF is never higher than 1.33 (mean VIF is 1.12), which 
indicates that there are no problems with multicollinearity between the other variables.  
The unit of analysis in this study is the firm, reflecting the governance choice that 
firms make when entering into an alliance with another firm. However, our decision to study 
firm choices in an alliance context (as opposed to considering the alliance as the unit of 
analysis) has some consequences for the estimation of our model, particularly in relation to 
the three independent variables: Industry Dissimilarity, Cultural Distance and Country 
Dissimilarity. For instance, when two firms in different industries decide to enter into an 
equity alliance, the data record two choices and thus two observations linking industry 
dissimilarity to equity. Our focus on firm choices may therefore underestimate the standard 
errors and overestimate the significance of the relation between the independent and 
dependent variables. To correct for this, we ran additional logit models and clustered the 
observations on the governance choice of two firms (i.e., the two alliance partners) at the level 
of the bilateral alliance. The models are estimated with robust standard errors. The results are 
consistent with the results reported in table III and figures 1-3.  
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DISCUSSION  
Findings and contribution 
This article set out to study the effect of alliance experience on alliance governance choices to 
determine when governance choices can best be explained by a reduction in mundane 
transaction costs and when they can be attributed to a reduction in opportunistic transaction 
costs. Our findings show that firms are relatively consistent in their choice of alliance 
governance structure over time. Firms that have experience with equity alliances choose 
equity in a new alliance, and firms that have experience with non-equity alliances choose a 
non-equity alliance, when mundane transaction costs can be reduced over time. Our results 
also show that the level of behavioural uncertainty involved in an alliance affects the impact 
of alliance experience on governance. As their experience increases, firms display a smaller 
increase in the probability of choosing equity when an alliance is characterized by high 
behavioural uncertainty than when it is characterized by low behavioural uncertainty. This 
indicates that experience can function as a safeguard in high-uncertainty alliances and enable 
firms to reduce opportunistic transaction costs in an alliance.  
By combining the literatures on alliance experience and governance, our study offers 
several contributions to each of these fields and, more broadly, provides new understanding 
for research on TCE, organizational learning and the field of strategic management. First, our 
study is one of the first to explore the links between experience and governance choices in 
detail by analysing more than 12,000 firm experiences with equity and non-equity alliances. 
We show that governance choices may depend on an efficient alignment between transaction 
attributes and governance forms but that they are also influenced by earlier governance 
choices made by firms. In effect, governance choices are strongly influenced by a firm’s past 
decisions on governance. Our study therefore contributes to the emerging field of alliance 
dynamics and shows that a firm’s previous governance choices have an impact on its current 
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alliance decisions (Reuer et al., 2016). This finding illustrates and confirms the observation 
that the combination of an experience or learning perspective and TCE can be fruitful 
(Argyres and Mayer, 2007).  
Second, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to choose the same governance 
structure over time. These choices by firms to reuse or reapply the same governance structure 
in successive alliances have been explained in this article by firms’ willingness to reduce the 
mundane transaction costs of establishing and managing the governance of inter-firm 
relations. The analysis of these mundane transaction costs in the context of alliance 
governance choices has largely been ignored in previous studies.  
Third, our study sheds light on the trade-off between mundane and opportunistic 
transaction costs. When we compare alliances characterized by high behavioural uncertainty 
to alliances with lower uncertainty, the former exhibit a moderate increase in their probability 
of choosing equity as their experience with equity increases. In high-uncertainty alliances, 
experience with equity thus acts as a substitute safeguard for equity governance. In low-
uncertainty alliances, firms encounter less opportunistic behaviour, which may suggest that 
they are mainly concerned with reducing mundane transaction costs. In high-uncertainty 
alliances, firms are aware of opportunistic transaction costs and realize that experience can 
replace the need for equity. When firms rely on experience as a substitute for equity 
governance to reduce opportunistic transaction costs, they forgo reducing mundane 
transaction costs. This finding supports the assertion of Argyres and Mayer (2007) that 
alliance experience and capabilities may act as a shift parameter and thus affect firms’ 
governance choices.  
Finally, our results contribute to the literature on the impact of alliance capabilities on 
different outcome variables, such as performance, innovation, alliance formation, and 
governance (Heimeriks et al., 2007; Schreiner et al., 2009). Several studies in this field have 
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argued that a better understanding of the impact of alliance capabilities on performance can be 
achieved by studying the intermediate impact of capabilities on alliance attributes (Ambrosini 
and Bowman, 2009; Niesten and Jolink, 2015). Our study demonstrates that the impact of 
alliance experience on governance depends on the transactional attribute of behavioural 
uncertainty.  
 
Limitations 
Some limitations must also be mentioned. First, the focus on the dyadic nature of inter-firm 
collaboration has supported the analysis of this article, illustrating the persistent governance 
choices of firms over time. By focusing on bilateral and dyadic alliances, we abstracted from 
the complexities of governance choices in multi-party alliances and governance choices of 
firms in the context of their alliance portfolio. Future research could study the impact of 
experience on the governance choices of firms by considering the governance structures of a 
firm’s current set of alliances including alliances involving more than one partner. 
Second, we have used the concept of transaction costs – including the differentiation 
between “mundane” and “opportunistic” transaction costs – as it has been described in the 
strategic management literature over the past 40 years. Although examples of both types of 
transaction costs have been provided, this approach only offers proxies for transaction costs 
by analysing governance choices over time. With transaction costs as the latent variable, this 
limitation can be overcome only by delving deeper into the actual transaction costs for each 
alliance.  
Third, our data on alliance experience are limited to five years prior to the 
announcement date of an alliance, following the convention that the effects of experience 
expire after a certain number of years. Further specifying the nature of alliance experience 
and clarifying its consequences can address this limitation. The five-year period may differ 
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across industries or technologies: experience with alliances established more than five years 
ago may still be relevant and used in stable industries, but this may not be the case for high-
tech and other highly dynamic industries. In addition, some firms may be very capable of 
codifying, storing, and using alliance experience, whereas others may make no explicit 
attempt to accumulate alliance capabilities. These differences between firms will also affect 
the number of alliance experience years that researchers should consider.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article responds to the call for further study of alliance dynamics that may impact or shift 
alliance decisions (Das and Teng, 2002; Reuer et al., 2016; Wang and Rajagopalan, 2014). 
We have studied the impact of alliance experience on alliance governance, and our findings 
demonstrate that governance decisions at a single point in time do not depend only on the 
characteristics of the transaction, as in TCE, but are also informed by earlier governance 
decisions. We have shown that firms reuse the same governance structure in successive 
alliances when mundane transaction costs can be reduced over time. This issue is far from 
trivial, as many governance decisions are not first-time decisions, and the sequence of alliance 
decision-making introduces continuity in governance choices. 
In this article, we have also demonstrated the importance of behavioural uncertainty in 
a time context and how this identifies alliance governance and alliance experience as shift 
parameters. In the case of no- (or low-) uncertainty alliances and the relative absence of 
opportunistic transaction costs, experience will reduce mundane transaction costs; however, in 
the presence of high behavioural uncertainty in an alliance, experience can reduce 
opportunistic transaction costs. In the latter case, alliance experience serves as a substitute for 
equity governance, and firms rely on their experience to reduce opportunistic transaction 
costs. We conclude that our analysis of governance experience complements the static 
 26 
theoretical perspectives of alliance decision-making and reveals avenues for future research 
on the impact of alliance capabilities on governance choices over time. 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Measurement Scale Frequency / Mean Min Max 
Equity Binomial No equity: 1,684 
Equity: 2,040 
0 1 
Experience with 
equity alliances 
Count Mean: 0.936 0 32 
Experience with non-
equity alliances 
Count Mean: 2.315 0 110 
Industry dissimilarity  Ordinal Different division: 1,588 
Different major group: 544 
Different industry group: 376 
Different industry: 322 
Same industry: 894 
1 5 
Cultural distance  Continuous Mean: 7.336 0 30.388 
Country dissimilarity  Binomial Different country: 2,254 
Same country: 1,470 
0 1 
Alliance purpose Nominal Production: 902 
Offering products and services: 1,978 
Research and development: 844 
1 3 
Technology transfer Binomial No transfer: 3,574 
Transfer: 150 
0 1 
Industry of alliance Nominal Agriculture, forestry and fishing: 12 
Mining: 386 
Construction: 78 
Manufacturing: 1,114 
Transportation and communication: 380  
Wholesale: 168 
Retail: 88 
Finance, insurance and real estate: 428  
Services: 1,056 
1 10 
VC backing of 
partners 
Binomial VC-backing: 175 
No VC-backing: 3,549 
0 1 
Tax haven Binomial Tax haven: 364 
No tax haven: 3,360 
0 1 
Year of alliance Nominal 2009: 1,442 
2010: 692 
2011: 1,590 
2009 2011 
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Table II. Association coefficients (Cramer’s V) 
 
 
* Significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level; **** significant at 0.001 level (based on LR Chi2). 
 Equity Experience 
with equity 
alliances 
Experience 
with non-
equity 
alliances 
Industry 
dissimilarity  
Cultural 
distance 
Country 
dissimilarity 
Alliance 
purpose 
Technology 
transfer 
Industry of 
the alliance 
VC 
backing of 
partners 
Tax 
haven 
Year of 
the 
alliance 
Equity 1.000            
Experience 
with equity 
alliances 
0.127**** 1.000           
Experience 
with non-
equity 
alliances 
0.198**** 0.342**** 1.000          
Industry 
dissimilarity  
0.176**** 0.099**** 0.130*** 1.000         
Cultural 
distance 
0.450**** 0.329 0.299 0.458 1.000        
Country 
dissimilarity 
0.092**** 0.129**** 0.128** 0.045 0.997**** 1.000       
Alliance 
purpose 
0.270**** 0.122**** 0.158**** 0.067**** 0.509**** 0.109**** 1.000      
Technology 
Transfer 
0.132**** 0.084 0.149 0.141**** 0.446 0.025 0.103**** 1.000     
Industry of 
the alliance 
0.323**** 0.086* 0.100 0.185**** 0.468**** 0.142**** 0.470**** 0.224**** 1.000    
VC backing 
of partners 
0.127**** 0.095*** 0.085 0.056** 0.287 0.011 0.047** 0.064*** 0.123**** 1.000   
Tax haven 0.074**** 0.059 0.142 0.062** 0.931**** 0.233**** 0.035* 0.012 0.083*** 0.000 1.000  
Year of the 
alliance 
0.212**** 0.128**** 0.170**** 0.064**** 0.449**** 0.027 0.057**** 0.084**** 0.113**** 0.021 0.033 1.000 
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Table III. GEE model predicting choice for equity governance 
Variables Model 1 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Model 2 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Model 3 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Model 4 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Model 5 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Model 6 
Odds ratios (robust 
standard errors) /  
p-values 
Ln Experience with equity alliances  1.690 (0.136) / 0.000 1.726 (0.139) / 0.000 1.955 (0.214) / 0.000 1.880 (0.187) / 0.000 1.936 (0.197) / 0.000 
Ln Experience with non-equity alliances  0.579 (0.033) / 0.000 0.585 (0.033) / 0.000 0.578 (0.033) / 0.000 0.577 (0.033) / 0.000 0.583 (0.033) / 0.000 
Industry dissimilarity  
       - Partner in different division                            
         (four digits different) 
       - Partner in different major group           
         (last four digits different) 
       - Partner in different industry group  
         (last two digits different) 
       - Partner in different industry  
         (last digit different)  
 
(Base category is partner in same 
industry; same 4 digits) 
 
Industry dissimilarity * Experience with 
equity alliances 
  
1.446 (0.146) / 0.000 
 
2.141 (0.287) / 0.000 
 
1.439 (0.210) / 0.013 
 
1.045 (0.153) / 0.763 
 
1.481 (0.149) / 0.000 
 
2.187 (0.291) / 0.000 
 
1.475 (0.215) / 0.008 
 
1.058 (0.154) / 0.699 
 
1.495 (0.152) / 0.000 
 
2.182 (0.293) / 0.000 
 
1.456 (0.213) / 0.010 
 
1.057 (0.155) / 0.707 
 
 
 
 
 
0.988 (0.006) / 0.030 
 
 
1.451 (0.146) / 0.000 
 
2.156 (0.289) / 0.000 
 
1.445 (0.211) / 0.011 
 
1.051 (0.154) / 0.735 
 
1.486 (0.150) / 0.000 
 
2.199 (0.293) / 0.000 
 
1.483 (0.216) / 0.007 
 
1.063 (0.155) / 0.678 
Cultural distance 
 
Cultural distance * Experience with 
equity alliances 
 1.034 (0.006) / 0.000  1.034 (0.006) / 0.000 1.034 (0.006) / 0.000 
 
0.997 (0.001) / 0.036 
 
Country dissimilarity 
(Base category is the same country) 
 
Country dissimilarity * Experience with 
equity alliances 
  1.384 (0.113) / 0.000   1.426 (0.119) / 0.000 
 
 
0.961 (0.018) / 0.039 
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Alliance Purpose 
      - Production 
      - Marketing 
 
(Base category is Research & 
Development) 
 
 
 
 
4.483 (0.599) / 0.000 
1.164 (0.116) / 0.129 
 
4.566 (0.607) / 0.000 
1.168 (0.116) / 0.119 
 
4.441 (0.592) / 0.000 
1.157 (0.115) / 0.144 
 
4.456 (0.594) / 0.000 
1.157 (0.115) / 0.143 
 
4.546 (0.604) / 0.000 
1.164 (0.116) / 0.127 
Technology transfer 0.454 (0.088) / 0.000 0.544 (0.110) / 0.003 0.537 (0.108) / 0.002 0.545 (0.110) / 0.003 0.549 (0.111) / 0.003 0.543 (0.109) / 0.002 
Industry of alliance 
       - Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
       - Mining 
       - Construction 
       - Manufacturing 
       - Transportation, communications, 
electric, gas and sanitary services 
       - Wholesale 
       - Retail 
       - Finance, insurance and real estate 
       - Public administration 
 
(Base category is Services) 
 
4.102 (2.279) / 0.011 
5.815 (0.812) / 0.000 
5.412 (1.521) / 0.000 
2.836 (0.268) / 0.000 
3.654 (0.493) / 0.000 
 
1.383 (0.238) / 0.060 
2.064 (0.490) / 0.002 
3.446 (0.437) / 0.000 
2.518 (1.403) / 0.098 
 
3.637 (2.262) / 0.038 
5.295 (0.796) / 0.000 
2.570 (0.777) / 0.002 
1.157 (0.147) / 0.250 
2.913 (0.427) / 0.000 
 
1.098 (0.208) / 0.624 
1.531 (0.383) / 0.088 
2.784 (0.383) / 0.000 
2.463 (1.535) / 0.148 
 
3.517 (2.263) / 0.051 
5.225 (0.783) / 0.000 
2.474 (0.748) / 0.003 
1.178 (0.149) / 0.196 
2.913 (0.426) / 0.000 
 
1.143 (0.217) / 0.481 
1.576 (0.387) / 0.064 
2.737 (0.376) / 0.000 
2.223 (1.386) / 0.200 
 
3.588 (2.219) / 0.039 
5.279 (0.796) / 0.000 
2.581 (0.777) / 0.002 
1.151 (0.146) / 0.268 
2.899 (0.425) / 0.000 
 
1.094 (0.208) / 0.637 
1.551 (0.393) / 0.084 
2.766 (0.380) / 0.000 
2.443 (1.527) / 0.153 
 
3.620 (2.233) / 0.037 
5.300 (0.799) / 0.000 
2.597 (0.781) / 0.002 
1.152 (0.146) / 0.264 
2.896 (0.426) / 0.000 
 
1.096 (0.208) / 0.631 
1.520 (0.379) / 0.094 
2.772 (0.382) / 0.000 
2.476 (1.541) / 0.145 
 
3.486 (2.236) / 0.052 
5.216 (0.783) / 0.000 
2.502 (0.753) / 0.002 
1.172 (0.149) / 0.211 
2.900 (0.425) / 0.000 
 
1.144 (0.218) / 0.478 
1.562 (0.384) / 0.069 
2.723 (0.374) / 0.000 
2.233 (1.394) / 0.198 
VC backing of partners 0.367 (0.068) / 0.000 0.349 (0.070) / 0.000 0.354 (0.071) / 0.000 0.350 (0.071) / 0.000 0.351 (0.070) / 0.000 0.355 (0.070) / 0.000 
Tax haven 1.719 (0.218) / 0.000 1.506 (0.203) / 0.002 1.507 (0.207) / 0.003 1.500 (0.203) / 0.003 1.495 (0.202) / 0.003 1.498 (0.206) / 0.003 
Year of alliance 
      - 2010 
      - 2011  
 
(Base category is 2009) 
 
2.837 (0.296) / 0.000 
2.064 (0.163) / 0.000 
 
2.917 (0.334) / 0.000 
2.167 (0.186) / 0.000 
 
2.896 (0.328) / 0.000 
2.156 (0.185) / 0.000 
 
2.916 (0.335) / 0.000 
2.172 (0.187) / 0.000 
 
2.926 (0.335) / 0.000 
2.165 (0.186) / 0.000 
 
2.903 (0.328) / 0.000 
2.155 (0.185) / 0.000 
Constant  0.329 (0.028) / 0.000 0.196 (0.027) / 0.000 0.198 (0.028) / 0.000 0.192 (0.027) / 0.000 0.192 (0.027) / 0.000 0.196 (0.028) / 0.000 
Model fit 
N=3724  
Wald Chi2 = 498.94 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald Chi2 = 725.65 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald Chi2 = 723.84 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald Chi2 = 723.97 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald Chi2 = 725.12 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald Chi2 = 721.95 
Prob < Chi2 = 0.0000 
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Figure 1 Interaction of experience and industry dissimilarity 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Interaction of experience and cultural distance 
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Figure 3 Interaction of experience and country dissimilarity 
 
 
 
